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Toward responsible ejaculations: the moral imperative for 
male contraceptive responsibility 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I argue that men should take primary responsibility for protecting against 
pregnancy. Male long-acting reversible contraceptives are currently in development, and, 
once approved, should be used as the standard method for avoiding pregnancy. Since 
women assume the risk of pregnancy when they engage in penis-in-vagina sex, men should 
do their utmost to ensure that their ejaculations are responsible, otherwise women shoulder 
a double burden of pregnancy risk plus contraceptive burden. Changing the expectations 
regarding responsibility for contraception would render penis-in-vagina sex more 
equitable, and could lead to a shift in the discourse around abortion access. I describe the 
sex-asymmetries of contraceptive responsibility and of the risks associated with pregnancy, 
and offer arguments in favour of men taking primary responsibility for contraception. My 
arguments centre on (a) analogies between contraception and vaccination, and unwanted 
pregnancy and disease; (b) a veil-of-ignorance approach, in which I contend that if a person 
were not told their sex, they would find a society in which men were expected to acquire 
and use effective contraceptives the fairest arrangement for everyone.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2018, parenting blogger Gabrielle Blair penned a widely-shared essay in which she 
criticised mainstream abortion discourse for focussing on women’s responsibility for 
unwanted pregnancy [1]. Blair pointed out that:  
all unwanted pregnancies are caused by the irresponsible ejaculations of men. 
[…] Pregnancies happen when men have an orgasm. Unwanted pregnancies 
happen when men orgasm irresponsibly. […] Think of abortion as the “cure” 
for an unwanted pregnancy. To stop abortions, we need to prevent the 
“disease” — meaning, the unwanted pregnancy itself. And the only way to do 
that is by focusing on men, because irresponsible ejaculations by men cause 
100% of unwanted pregnancy. 
 
The popularity of the post derived from its novelty in inverting the mainstream view on 
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contraception, pregnancy, and abortion, which are usually seen as women’s issues in which 
men play a minor, fleeting role. Not only does Blair point out that whenever an unwanted 
pregnancy occurs, a man is inculpated, she also compares unwanted pregnancy to disease, 
which encourages different notions of responsibility to those that are typically applied. 
 
In this paper, I too critique the irresponsible ejaculations of men, explore the analogy 
between pregnancy and disease, and comment on the relationship between contraceptive 
responsibility and abortion discourse. I show that contraceptive asymmetry, which derives 
from the confluence of sexed medical research agendas and gendered social norms, has 
bolstered sex inequity by situating responsibility at the site of risk, i.e. within the female 
body. Accordingly, I argue that since women assume the embodied risk of unwanted 
pregnancy when they engage in penis-in-vagina sex, men should do their utmost to ensure 
that their ejaculations are responsible by taking primary responsibility for contraception, 
otherwise woman face the additional burden of protecting against unwanted pregnancy. 
My arguments centre on (a) testing intuitions about risk and responsibility through 
analogies which compare contraception to vaccination, and pregnancy to disease; (b) using 
a veil-of-ignorance approach to establish a fair distribution of risk and responsibility in 
relation to unwanted pregnancy. I finish by recommending that long-acting male hormonal 
contraceptive options be developed and championed in order to enable men to take primary 
responsibility for minimising the risk of unwanted pregnancy. Once approved, men should 
adopt these methods as a way of ensuring greater equity around PIV sex. Governments, 
academic researchers, public health officials, medical professionals, and school-teachers 
will also have critical roles to play in ensuring that male LARCs gain the uptake necessary 
in order to contribute to justice in PIV sex. 
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The injustice of the asymmetry in contraceptive responsibility, and the need for better 
contraceptive options, is relatively uncontroversial, even if the norms seem resistant to 
change and the science has been slow to arrive. The novel contribution of this paper is to 
suggest that men should take primary (rather than, say, shared) responsibility for 
contraception, and to do so via two new lines of argument which consider the distribution 
of risk and burdens in relation to avoiding unwanted pregnancy. My hope is that these 
arguments will challenge conventional intuitions as to how risk and responsibility are 
configured and distributed in relation to unwanted pregnancy.  
 
In this paper, I refer only to penis-in-vagina (PIV) sex, since I am concerned with the risk 
of pregnancy. I use the gender terms “man” and “woman” throughout. While some trans-
men may become pregnant, and some trans-women may impregnate, I am interested in the 
confluence of biology and social roles: i.e. potential-impregnators gendered as men, 
potential-impregnatees gendered as women. This is because contraceptive asymmetry is 
not only sexed, it is also gendered in terms of the social norms around risk and 
responsibility. My discussion is also intended only to apply to pregnancies, whether 
potential or actual, which are mutually unwanted, i.e. where both PIV sex partners do not 
intend or wish to procreate.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe the way in which 
contraceptive responsibility and the pregnancy risks of PIV sex are characterised by sex-
inequality. In the following section, I outline how PIV sex asymmetry might be combatted 
by presenting arguments which aim to establish that men ought to take responsibility for 
protecting against unwanted pregnancy. The final sections endorse the development and 
promotion of male long-acting reversible contraceptives as a promising route for moving 
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towards PIV sex equity, and tackle some anticipated counter-arguments.   
 
RISKS AND RESPONSIBILTIES IN PIV SEX 
 
When a woman engages in consensual penis-in-vagina (PIV) sex, she accepts a non-zero 
chance of pregnancy, regardless of whether or what contraception is used.1 No perfect 
contraceptive exists; PIV sex always has the potential to be unintentionally reproductive. 
Abstinence is therefore the only way of avoiding the risk of pregnancy, but that means 
exclusion from an activity that most adults find enjoyable and important to their wellbeing 
and the flourishing of particular relationships. Though imperfect, contraceptives 
substantially weaken the causal link between PIV sex and pregnancy, and are therefore 
important to understanding responsibility for pregnancy. As it stands, women take primary 
responsibility for the use of contraceptives. Challenging this norm offers a way of 
destabilising dominant discourses on responsibility for unwanted pregnancy, which also 
has consequences for the abortion debate. 
 
Contraceptive asymmetry  
Eleven methods of birth control act upon the female body, including: barrier methods, such 
as the female condom, cervical cap, sponge, diaphragm, and tubal ligation; hormonal 
methods, such as a vaginal ring or contraceptive pill; long-acting reversible contraceptive 
(LARC) methods, such as an implant, patch, injection, or intrauterine device [2]. Just two 
act upon the male body—the male condom and vasectomy—and there are currently no 
                                                          
1 All sex is assumed to be consensual unless stated. The risk of sexually-transmitted infections is set aside in 
order to maintain the focus of the paper. All pregnancies, whether potential or actual, are assumed to be 
mutually unwanted. 
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approved male hormonal contraceptive options. Women alone use contraception in 67.3% 
of cases of PIV sex. Men alone contracept in just a third of cases (usually limited to causal 
sex), but since women often negotiate and provide male contraception, they are involved 
in ensuring contraception is used in 91% of cases [3]. Within relationships, female 
sterilisation and intrauterine devices are the most commonly used forms of contraception, 
followed by the contraceptive pill and then condoms [4].  
 
Asymmetries in contraception are both social and medical, and are therefore both sexed 
and gendered.2 The medical options are sex-asymmetric because of gendered social norms 
about responsibility for sex, which have in turn been bolstered by the medical “realities” 
about who is able to effectively contracept. There are several specific ways in which these 
norms operate.  
 
First, within the biomedical paradigm, the reproductive capacity of women is over-
emphasised, often to the detriment of the research and treatment of non-reproductive health 
issues [9]. Accordingly, the female body has been taken as the locus of intervention in the 
development of contraceptive methods over the last century, a trend that is often referred 
to as the “feminization of reproduction” [10]. Facilitating “safe” penis-in-vagina sex 
through female hormonal methods became such a dogmatic medical priority in the 1960s 
and 1970s that side effects were downplayed, and approval was granted even where the 
risks to women’s health were severe [8,11,12].  
 
                                                          
2 Though I will not have space to explore this in detail here, it is important to note that contraceptive inequality 
is not only a gendered phenomenon, but is also inflected by other forms of marginalisation. Women of colour, 
working class women, disabled women, and Global South women have been subject to contraceptive 
injustices, including forced sterilisation [5,6], forced contraception [7], and recruitment into dangerous 
contraceptive trials [8].  
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Second, there is a tendency to view female bodies as diseased and in need of correction 
[13].3 Contraception may be seen as a way of correcting the compromised female body, 
implying that the propensity to become pregnant is the pathology, rather than the propensity 
to make someone pregnant.4 This accedes to social norms of female vulnerability, in which 
women are represented as “damsels in distress” in need of paternalistic intervention, which 
in this case comes from biomedicine. The “cure”—modifying the female body—appears 
to “level up” women by rendering them nearly as invulnerable to the harm of pregnancy as 
men are inherently. As with other measures for achieving equality, “levelling down”—that 
is, encouraging or helping men to be more like normative women—is overlooked.5 Note 
also that this approach departs from the usual biomedical approach of intervening to correct 
the risk-carrier (e.g. a potential infector), a point I return to in the next section. The idea of 
making male bodies benign in relation to the risk of impregnation has only recently become 
a serious research agenda, and is explored in the penultimate section of the paper.  
 
Lisa Campo-Engelstein has explored the incongruous role of trust in relation to the sex-
asymmetry of contraceptive responsibility [13,14]. Across many domains, women are 
characterised as irrational and untrustworthy, while men are represented as rational agents 
who are thereby well-suited to roles which require high levels of responsibility and confer 
considerable social power. It therefore seems contradictory that women should be expected 
                                                          
3 Consider that menstruation and menopause are often seen as aberrant or pathological, rather than indicative 
of normal functioning. 
4 The idea of female bodies as pathologically vulnerable—rather than male bodies as pathologically 
hazardous—has parallels elsewhere: consider that women are deemed to be vulnerable to sexual assault, 
against which they are expected to continually attempt to protect themselves, while men’s sexual behaviour 
is often seen as inevitable and uncontrollable, which is to say, natural. 
5 Note that efforts towards gender equality tend to focus on encouraging women to access the spaces, roles, 
and behaviours typically associated with normative men. For example, women’s participation in the paid 
workforce is often used as a proxy for gender equality, while men’s contribution to unpaid domestic labour 
is rarely seen as relevant.  
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to take responsibility for something as important as contraception.6 Campo-Engelstein 
points out that while men are in the general case seen as rational and responsible, this is 
inverted in the specific case of the domestic realm, where men are seen as inherently 
incompetent in relation to domestic labour, and irrational and reckless in relation to sex, 
since they may be overruled by the “uncontrollable” male libido.7 This myth defends a 
gendered social norm, in which women are expected to shoulder the burden of labour and 
responsibility in the private, domestic sphere as a consequence of their alleged biological 
suitability (and men’s biological unsuitability) to these tasks. 8 Therefore, women must take 
control of the risks of sex because men cannot be trusted to, but men’s incompetence on 
this score has no bearing on their fitness for power and responsibility in other domains.9 
This myth of domain-specific incompetence and irrationality is liberating for men. It allows 
them: 
to have sex worry-free, to avoid bodily invasion, and to have enhanced sexual 
access to women. It also means that men do not have to take the blame for 
unintended pregnancies (p. 589) [13]. 
 
One major moral problem with the asymmetry of contraceptive responsibility is that it gives 
rise to an asymmetry of blame. If women are the primary agents in the reproductive domain, 
                                                          
6 Women are nonetheless often not trusted to make decisions regarding sterilisation, especially if they are 
young (i.e. in their twenties), white, and childfree [15]. (Women of colour have historically been in the even 
more marginal position of being liable to be sterilised without consent.)  Doctors sometimes refuse on the 
assumption of the patient’s future regret, thereby undermining the patient’s autonomous preference [16,17]. 
Therefore, while women are expected to prevent unwanted pregnancies, they are not always permitted to rule 
out pregnancy altogether, which raises the question of whose needs contraception is intended to serve.   
7 While women are expected to take the lead in contraceptive-use, this agency does not generally extend to 
the sexual encounter itself, where men tend to have a greater degree of agency in the negotiation of whether, 
how, and what sex is done [18,19]. 
8 Many attempts have been made to ground the gendered division of household labour in biology. See e.g. 
[20] for an example of how easily such myths are debunked.  
9 This ostensible domain-specificity of women’s increased (and men’s reduced) trustworthiness mirrors 
Miranda Fricker’s observation that the “testimonial injustice” experienced by women and people of colour—
in which their credibility is unfairly deflated—is also limited to specific areas of knowledge which do not 
threaten the privilege or authority of more powerful groups. She notes that the “tendency for incoherence in 
human prejudice, sustained through mechanisms of psychological compartmentalization, is such that 
significant pockets of epistemic trust can remain relatively untouched, even by a powerful racist [or sexist] 
ideology that corrupts that same trust in countless other contexts” (p.131) [21].  
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and are tasked with ensuring that effective contraception is used, then they are liable to be 
blamed when it fails. This is coherent with a more general tendency to blame women for 
failings in the private domain e.g. victim-blaming in cases of sexual harassment and assault 
or domestic abuse, blaming women for untidy houses, blaming mothers for their children’s 
shortcomings. Even the language that is used to describe unwanted pregnancies tends to 
inculpate the woman and/or erase the role of the man. Consider the common phrase “fallen 
pregnant” which implies that pregnancy occurs as a matter of course, like an illness (c.f. 
“fallen ill”) within which men play no part, or as a careless accident (“she’s fallen over”). 
There is also the more old-fashioned connotation of a “fallen woman.” Even worse is the 
common expression “got herself pregnant” (see e.g. [22]) which implies that women can 
singlehandedly bring about conception.  
 
How we assign blame is important because it determines societal responses to unwanted 
pregnancies. Blame plays a prominent role in public discourse on abortion: amongst those 
surveyed, pregnancy following rape is considered to be the second most morally acceptable 
reason for abortion10 [23], presumably on the grounds that since a person who was raped 
did not consent to sex, a fortiori, she did not consent to gestating a foetus. In cases of 
consensual sex, women are commonly deemed to be responsible for an unwanted 
pregnancy in such a way as to reduce the perceived right to an abortion.11  
 
Another major moral problem is that while contraceptive asymmetry may promise women 
greater control over avoiding pregnancy, it comes with considerable burdens.12 There is the 
                                                          
10 The first is the mother’s health being endangered. 
11 This is known as the “responsibility argument,” or the “responsibility objection” to abortion, and has 
been defended and disputed within the philosophical literature [24–29]. 
12 The abundance of forms of female contraception does not necessarily equate to (greater) control over the 
use of contraception. Reproductive coercion, including birth control sabotage (e.g. tearing condoms, 
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cost of purchasing the contraception (where relevant); the time, effort, and inconvenience 
of attending related medical appointments, researching and experimenting to find the most 
appropriate method, and remembering to use or renew the contraception; the pain and 
discomfort of medical check-ups. Further, almost all forms of contraception involve side 
effects, including: bleeding, nausea, breast tenderness, weight gain, acne, decreased libido, 
mood swings, increased blood pressure, cystitis, increased risk of thrombosis and breast 
cancer. It is telling that 50% of women have stopped using at least one form of 
contraception due to dissatisfaction with side effects, rather than inadequate efficacy 
[31,32]. 
 
Finally, while contraceptive asymmetry generally benefits men, there are obvious 
downsides. Men are unable to take optimal responsibility for avoiding pregnancy, which, 
particularly in jurisdictions in which men are compelled to make child support payments, 
fails to offer an acceptable level of control. Consider that the only reversible contraceptive 
option available to men is a condom, yet condoms have a typical failure rate of between 9 
and 18%, while failure rates for implants and IUDs are less than one percent [33,34].  
 
The risk asymmetry of PIV sex 
Let us assume that men and women who have consensual PIV sex desire that sex equally, 
and derive the same degree of enjoyment from it.13 Women approach that sex with a level 
of risk that is much greater than a man’s, since even when using contraception correctly, a 
woman has a non-zero chance of becoming pregnant as a result of sex [36]. Sex therefore 
                                                          
restricting access to contraception or clinics, being coerced into sex without a condom, removing a condom 
during sex) is common, with up to 15% of those surveyed reporting being subject to these practices. Women 
of colour, working class women, and victims of intimate partner violence are particularly at risk [30]. 
13 Although note that studies show that this is unlikely to be the case: only around 20% of women can reliably 
reach orgasm through penis-in-vagina sex alone [35].  
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carries various pregnancy-related risks for women. Men have no risk of becoming 
pregnant, but also face risks in relation to causing an unwanted pregnancy. Table 1 outlines 
some of these risks. I do not attempt to quantify the degree of risk, which will clearly differ 
according to the individual and context, but merely note whether the risk applies to women 
and men in the general case. Note that some men never find out that they have caused a 
pregnancy, so that they can be epistemically shielded from some pregnancy-related risks 
in ways that women cannot.  
 
Pregnancy-related risks associated with PIV sex Women Men 
Physical impact of pregnancy Yes No 
Physical impact of abortion Yes No 
Cost of medical appointments (e.g. in time, opportunity 
and/or money) 
Yes Maybe 
Distress associated with abortion Maybe Maybe 
Distress associated with prospect of unwanted child Maybe Maybe 
Financial and emotional cost of unwanted child  Maybe Maybe 
Distress associated with potential or actual 
discrimination or stigma (e.g. in employment, as a 
consumer, in public) 
Maybe14 No 
Table 1: Pregnancy-related risks of penis-in-vagina sex for women and men 
 
As one would expect, in having PIV sex women face greater pregnancy-related risks than 
men, including bodily risks, emotional and financial burdens, and opportunity costs. 
However, in jurisdictions in which abortion is available, men generally have less control 
                                                          
14 Pregnant women and new mothers are at risk of discrimination in the workplace (which can include reduced 
hours, disciplinary action, inability to progress, and unfair dismissal), as consumers (when buying e.g. 
cigarettes, alcohol), and when breastfeeding in public.  
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than women over whether an unwanted pregnancy results in childbirth. In some cases, men 
can end up making long-term child support contributions for unwanted children [37].  
 
TOWARD SEX EQUITY I: ANALOGIES WITH INFECTION PREVENTION 
 
How can we adjust the terms of PIV sex to ensure that men and women access it more 
equitably, given the asymmetry in the pregnancy-related risks they face? One option is to 
reduce a woman’s risk of becoming pregnant, by improving her access to a range of 
contraceptive methods. Yet as the last section showed, contraceptive use is burdensome. 
Therefore, this cannot be a solution to the inequity problem, since it reduces one 
asymmetric burden by imposing another, and since the original risk remains non-trivial, 
this makes PIV sex even more inequitable. While the improvement of current female 
contraceptive methods (i.e. fewer side effects, higher efficacy, reduced invasiveness, 
improved control, lower cost) would be a welcome development, it is not, on its own, a 
satisfactory answer to PIV sex asymmetry.  
 
A second option is to make sure that women have optimal access to safe abortions, so that 
they are easily able to terminate unwanted pregnancies. Again, access to abortions is 
important, but this “solution” tends to entrench the inequity of PIV sex. Abortions are 
generally very safe, but there are common side effects, and in some cases serious risks. 
Moreover, abortions can be expensive, difficult or inconvenient to access, and remain 
significantly stigmatised. While abortion is usually presented as a victory for women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights, it has also tended to improve men’s access to PIV sex while 
minimising the consequences for them. Catherine Mackinnon points out that the 
“availability of abortion enhances the availability of intercourse” and that the rights which 
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ground access to abortion are like “an injury presented as a gift, a sword in men’s hands 
presented as a shield in women’s” [38].15 As Andrea Dworkin puts it, men had a personal 
stake in the legalisation of abortion, since it removed a significant barrier to women’s 
reservations about PIV sex: “Getting laid was at stake” [40]. 
 
Another option is to improve men’s access to effective contraceptives and change the social 
expectations regarding their use, so that men take primary responsibility for avoiding 
unwanted pregnancy. I will argue that this is the most promising route to equity, as it would 
allow men to take optimal precautions to ensure that they are not able to cause unwanted 
pregnancies. My argument starts with the intuition is that if A wishes to engage in a 
mutually enjoyable16 activity with B, knowing that B necessarily takes greater risk, that risk 
should be minimised in ways that require A to shoulder a fair share of the associated 
burdens. In the remainder of this section, I will offer some arguments to ground this 
intuition.  
 
Consider an analogy. When healthy adults consent to vaccination (or do so on behalf of 
children), they do so in part to protect themselves from illness, but also to safeguard more 
vulnerable people who cannot be vaccinated—infants, elderly people, and those who are 
immuno-compromised—from serious illness or death. Vaccination entails minor burdens: 
injections are painful, medical appointments take time and organisation, there can be minor 
side effects, and there is a small risk of more serious complications. Yet many of us would 
                                                          
15 Mackinnon also notes that the Playboy Foundation (a misogynistic institution by any measure) has donated 
funds to organisations that advocate for abortion access [39]. 
16 As in note 13, “mutually enjoyable” is a slight misnomer, since another PIV sex inequality is relevant here: 
that of sexual pleasure. Studies show that women engaging in PIV sex with men are less likely than their 
partners to orgasm and more likely to experience pain [35,41]. Faking an orgasm in order to end “bad” sex is 
a commonly-reported strategy [19]. Accordingly, one might argue that men have greater responsibility for 
PIV sex since they stand to gain more physical pleasure from it.  
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argue that it is morally right that those who can be vaccinated agree to do so in order to 
better protect those who cannot, and who are likely to suffer most if infected.17 It would 
seem unreasonable to instead insist that vulnerable groups avoid normal social behaviour 
(e.g. interacting with others) which increase their risk of infection, or that they be required 
to take regular medication with serious side effects which allows them to stay healthy 
without requiring others to take on any burden. Now compare the disease to pregnancy, the 
vaccination to some form of long-acting male contraceptive, the normal social behaviour 
to sex, and the regular medication to a female contraceptive.  
 
A related analogy is helpful in further probing our intuitions. Consider a disease to which 
only women are susceptible, and for which men are the only vectors. The disease is 
transmitted through a form of intimate social interaction which most adults consider to be 
an important part of human flourishing. If women contract this disease, they are infected 
for nine months unless they undergo treatment, which can be expensive, medically onerous, 
and may require surgery. The infection itself carries risks of cramp, diabetes, bleeding, 
back pain, tiredness, digestive issues, urinary incontinence, deep vein thrombosis, 
headaches, high blood pressure, indigestion, nausea, haemorrhoids, varicose veins, 
sleeplessness, mental health issues, and mortality [42].  It is likely to affect a woman’s 
ability to work, and may cause her to experience discrimination.18 There are several ways 
of preventing women from contracting the disease: (a) women refrain from an activity that 
most consider to be important to human flourishing; (b) women wear protective gear, take 
long-term medications to minimise their risk, or provide protective gear for men; (c) men 
                                                          
17 That also has the advantage of working towards the elimination of the general risk by contributing to the 
drastic reduction of the pathogen within the population if herd immunity is attained. 
18 Shulamith Firestone famously described pregnancy as “barbaric” [43]; Kraft argues that pregnancy should 
be seen as a harm, though it does not necessarily follow that a woman is wronged if she becomes pregnant 
[44].  
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always bring their own protective gear and use it, or (d) men are vaccinated against the 
disease so that they cannot transmit to women.  
 
Should women take responsibility—through (a) or (b)—because they can be harmed, or 
should men take responsibility—through (c) or (d)—because they can cause harm? To put 
it another way: should we treat women as the subjects of medicalisation since the infection 
affects their body, or should we treat men as the subjects of medicalisation since their 
bodies constitute a risk to others? How should the risks and harms of the disease be 
minimised? Of course, one cannot violate a person’s bodily autonomy by mandating bodily 
intervention, so the question must be settled by considering what the relevant parties ought 
to choose, what health professionals and educators ought to encourage, and, perhaps, what 
legislators ought to penalise.  
 
Assume that all risk-reducing measures are burdensome. One might argue that a woman 
has more of an interest in protecting against the disease, since she is harmed by it. A woman 
is likely to see her burdensome intervention as protecting herself, i.e. as a self-interested 
act, while a man might see his burdensome intervention as protecting others, i.e. as a 
supererogatory act. Supererogation is more demanding, morally, than self-interest, 
therefore we might reasonably expect that women would readily protect themselves against 
harm and men would less readily choose to protect others against harm, thereby justifying 
the current status quo. Further, failure to perform a supererogatory act is not blameworthy, 
so that the status quo is not morally troubling.  
 
But this line of reasoning doesn’t succeed. Supererogatory acts are those that exceed the 
requirements of duty, and asking a man to ensure that he cannot harm a woman through 
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PIV sex seems to fall squarely within his duties to her. To illustrate this, let us return to the 
previous analogy and draw on arguments made within the work of Jamrozik et al., who 
argue that opting out of vaccination is blameworthy [45]. They too must show that the 
duty—in their case, to be vaccinated; in my case, to minimise one’s risk of impregnating 
others—is not supererogatory. They must tackle the contention that vaccination is too 
demanding, since it is not reasonable to expect a person to do so much in order to minimise 
their risk to others. Their strategy is to argue that vaccination also benefits the person who 
is vaccinated. In my case, protecting oneself against impregnating others protects against 
the burdens of pregnancy as they affect men (see Table 1), which are not negligible, even 
if they are comparatively small. It seems plausible that for most men, the burden of the 
prospect of an unwanted child outweighs the burden of using contraception. Second, a 
person who refuses to be vaccinated in order to avoid the associated burdens, but benefits 
from herd immunity, can be charged with free-riding. Similar concerns can be raised in 
relation to a man who benefits from avoiding the burdens of unwanted pregnancies by 
relying on his partners to be protected. Finally, one can argue that it is justifiable to impose 
small burdens on members of a society (vaccination, or men contracepting) provided the 
risks and benefits are shared equitably within that society. Without vaccination, and 
without men taking primary contraceptive responsibility, the burden of risk falls 
inequitably on those who are vulnerable, either immunologically or reproductively.19  
                                                          
19 It is illuminative to compare pregnancy to another sexually-transmitted condition: HIV. There are morally 
salient parallels between the two cases: one person is asymmetrically at risk of causing long-term harm to 
another person. Bennett et al. have argued that a person is wronged by sexually-transmitted HIV infection if 
their partner was aware of their own infection and they neglected to attempt to protect against transmission 
[46]. Superimposing that reasoning here: men know that they can make women pregnant, therefore failure to 
attempt to protect against impregnation using some form of contraception is blameworthy. This doesn’t go 
so far as to require a disruption of the bodily asymmetry of contraception—requesting that protection is used 
is not the same as taking primary responsibility for it—but more minimally establishes that men must take 
some responsibility for ensuring that reliable contraception is used. One might object that there is an 
important point of disanalogy: pregnancy is an expectable risk of PIV sex, HIV-transmission is not, which is 
why disclosure is required in the latter case but not the former. Yet impregnation is an expectable risk only 
because our social norms and the medical technologies driven by those norms have led us to believe that it is 
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In this section I have explored some moral intuitions around responsibility for avoiding 
unwanted pregnancy by comparing contraception to vaccination, and pregnancy to disease. 
While analogies need not be perfect to be efficacious, an important point of disanalogy 
must be engaged with: under ordinary circumstances, diseases are always unwanted, 
whereas pregnancy is in many cases desperately wanted, which would make it a strange 
kind of disease.20 Further, I have criticised the medicalisation of women’s bodies, only to 
describe pregnancy—which is considered by many to be a “normal” part of the life-course 
of many women—as pathological, which seems contradictory. My response to these 
objections is that while unwanted pregnancy and wanted pregnancy may be biologically 
identical, their social interpretations ought to be as different as a long-term illness is to an 
exciting new opportunity; the first tends to limit one’s life, the second to further one’s life 
goals.21 In this article, I am only concerned with unwanted pregnancies and their social 
interpretations, and so my analysis is intended to apply only to the social category of 
unwanted pregnancies. 
 
TOWARD SEX EQUITY II: A VEIL-OF-IGNORANCE APPROACH  
 
Another way of approaching the problem of the risk-inequity of PIV sex is to ask what the 
social norms around contraceptive responsibility would look like in a just society. Or, to 
be more explicitly contractualist, what freedoms could we expect an individual to surrender 
in exchange for being protected from subjection to an unfair level of burden? A productive 
                                                          
acceptable for men to arrive at a sexual encounter without having in any way reduced their risk to their 
partner, and for that risk not to be discussed, but to have been dealt with already by his partner.  
20 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  
21 Even that dichotomy is too simple, since a pregnancy can be wanted and still feel like a disabling disease. 
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way to proceed in answering these questions is to make use of a “veil of ignorance” 
approach.22 Both Rawls and Dworkin have offered conceptions of justice which utilise this 
hypothetical tool [48,49] 
 
In Rawls’ theory, rational agents are asked to agree upon the terms of a just society by 
deliberating behind a veil of ignorance which prevents them from knowing what their 
morally arbitrary identities would be in the hypothetical society, but allows them epistemic 
access to other details of science and human behaviour (e.g. they know that some people 
will be disabled, that altruism will be limited, that wombs are needed to gestate foetuses). 
From behind the veil they must attempt to guarantee that whatever characteristics they 
might have in that society, they will nonetheless have secure access to primary social 
goods. One heuristic they might draw upon is Rawls’ “maximin” principle: rational agents 
ought only to accept inequalities which advantage those who are worst-off. Rawls reasons 
that the most just state of affairs within a hypothetical society can be imagined by 
considering those who are likely to be worst off, and then arranging that society so that 
those people do as well as is possible having accounted for the differences that make them 
worse off in the first place.23 Similarly, in Dworkin’s theory, redistributive justice 
minimises the effects of “natural inequalities” by insuring against them. Specifically, an 
agent making judgements about which natural inequalities to intervene upon must do so 
                                                          
22 The argument in this section applies a similar method to that deployed by Anna Smajdor, who contends 
that research into ectogenesis techniques should be prioritised as a way of liberating women from the harms 
of pregnancy [47]. Smajdor draws on Dworkin’s contention that natural inequalities are appropriate targets 
for redistributive justice [48], and endorses the implementation of a veil-of-ignorance strategy for 
determining which inequalities must be prioritised for intervention. She argues that if a person were not told 
their sex, they would prefer to join a society in which ectogenesis had been perfected, so that no person would 
have to bear the burdens of pregnancy in order to reproduce.  
 
23 Rawls’ philosophy has been subject to criticism for feminists on various fronts for its failure to account for 
the experiences of women [50,51]. Here, I co-opt one component of the theory for feminist purposes, as have 
others [52]. 
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from behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which natural inequalities they might be 
personally disadvantaged by. 
 
I wish to draw on the spirit of both of these approaches: any natural inequalities or morally 
arbitrary details which affect a person’s access to resources should be placed behind a veil 
of ignorance, and we must then decide on a set of fair expectations regarding measures 
taken to avoid unwanted pregnancy. As Smajdor points out in her work on ectogenesis, 
pregnancy burdens women, and the “fact that men do not have to go through pregnancy to 
have a genetically-related child, whereas women do, is a natural inequality” [53]. 
Correlatively, I take it that the risks of pregnancy are also a natural inequality which is an 
appropriate locus for considerations of justice.  
 
Women are worse off than men vis-à-vis PIV sex, since they can become pregnant, which 
puts them at risk of various harms (see Table 1). Yet men are not completely burden-free: 
they too experience risks of harm via unintended impregnation. What form should a society 
take in which the burdens of PIV sex are fairly distributed? Offering multiple safe, effective 
female contraceptive methods (including abortion) is an important starting point, but, as 
we have seen, it does not solve the problem since all contraceptive methods come with 
burdens, which may end up further increasing the disadvantage. I suggest that we instead 
focus on removing the risk by expecting men to make changes to their bodies so that they 
do not pose a risk to women via PIV sex. While this would present a burden for men, that 
burden is less onerous than the cost to women of pregnancy risk plus contraceptive burden, 
and this would also allow men to protect against the pregnancy-related risks they face 
without infringing upon the bodily autonomy of women. Then if, from behind a “veil of 
ignorance” a person was told they would join such a society without knowing the sex of 
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their body or their sexual preferences, they would be likely to find such an arrangement to 
be fairest [49]. Ending up as a woman would mean facing the risk of pregnancy, but not the 
primary responsibility or burden for protecting against it. Ending up as a man would mean 
accepting the burden and responsibility for avoiding impregnation while having no risk of 
becoming pregnant.  
 
One might object that consensual PIV sex is voluntary. Accordingly, the risks of PIV sex, 
which contraception guards against, are as a result of “option luck” rather than “brute luck.” 
As Dworkin puts it, option luck “is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn 
out—whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should 
have anticipated and might have declined,” while brute luck is “a matter of how risks fall 
out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles” [54]. Yet men and women both voluntarily 
engage in PIV sex, but are not exposed to the same level of risk. Accordingly, accepting 
the reality that many people will voluntarily engage in PIV sex as a more realistic baseline 
than the expectation of abstinence, and recognising that PIV sex necessarily requires both 
partners, pregnancy-related risks begin to look like bad brute luck for women. 
 
In the next section I consider options for ensuring that men can take responsibility for the 
pregnancy-related risks of PIV sex.  
 
SEEKING EQUITY THROUGH MALE CONTRACEPTION 
 
As it stands, men do not have contraceptive choices that provide them with the optimal 
ability to take responsibility for the risks of PIV sex. A vasectomy is a serious surgical 
procedure which is not always reversible. Male condoms are a reliable form of 
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contraception if used properly, and have no side effects, but studies show that while men 
may physically wear them, they do not generally take responsibility for acquiring them or 
ensuring they are used [55,56], and their failure rate (9-18%) is much higher than that of 
long-acting female contraceptives [33,34]. Further, it is all too easy for women to also take 
responsibility for this ostensibly “male” form of contraception. Undoubtedly, given the 
arguments I have made, justice in the present context requires that men acquire and 
proactively use condoms, and/or offer to take responsibility for the planning and cost of 
any additional or alternative contraception their partners may use. Yet men ought also to 
have the option of more effective, longer-acting forms of contraception, which will 
optimise their ability to shoulder the requisite level of burden for there to be sex justice in 
the joint endeavour of avoiding unwanted pregnancy.24 
 
The development, authorisation, and uptake of male long-acting reversible contraceptives 
(LARCs) as a medical intervention would benefit women and men. 25  LARCs may be a 
particularly apposite form of contraception for men within the current discourse around 
sexual responsibility, since, as Campo-Engelstein notes, their long-acting nature 
circumvents any (bogus) argument about a man’s uncontrollable sex drive, as the “claim 
that men cannot use contraception because of their uncontrollable libido only works for 
contraception that is used in the heat of the moment” (p. 610) [13]. LARCs would also 
enable men to protect themselves against any concerns they may have about reproductive 
                                                          
24 I do not intend to suggest that men’s failure to assume adequate contraceptive responsibility can be wholly 
attributed to the unavailability of male hormonal contraceptives. That puts the cart before the horse. Men’s 
refusal to take contraceptive responsibility has discouraged progress towards the development of male 
hormonal contraceptives. As I have discussed, the medical and social realities are intertwined.  
25 Clearly, a male LARC would have no efficacy against sexually-transmitted infections. As such, male 
LARCs are only intended in this discussion to serve as replacements for female LARCs, to be used as 
protection against pregnancy, and only within PIV sex encounters in which the risk of STIs is negligible. 
Otherwise, a barrier method should also be used. 
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coercion in the form of non-consensual insemination [57]. 
 
Male LARCs also have a temporal advantage over other forms of contraception. As a 
general rule, if a harm is to be avoided, it is preferable to protect against it at the earliest 
point in the causal chain. Consider that it is cheaper and safer to require that catalytic 
converters are installed in car engines so that they do not release noxious gases than merely 
reactively provide masks and emergency respiratory care to other road users. Public health 
interventions tend to favour such “upstream” or “distal” interventions. Not only do they 
make us all automatically safer (cars are less dangerous, measles has fewer potential 
victims, enclosed public spaces are free of second-hand smoke), they also leave open the 
possibility of other preventative and curative measures being introduced at later parts of 
the causal chain, strengthening the overall protection against harm, or the reduction of the 
harm. Intervening at an earlier point in time means that all subsequent events necessarily 
inherit the benefits of the protective measure. So if a man uses a LARC that renders his 
semen optimally non-fertile, and then also uses a barrier method, or his partner is already 
contracepted, his chances of impregnating somebody are vastly reduced.  
 
Research into alternative male contraceptives only began in the 1970s, fifty years after 
female contraceptives were first explored [58]. Since then, several different research 
avenues have been pursued, leading to the development and testing of a diverse set of 
reversible long-acting male contraceptives [59], several of which have now reached phase 
III clinical trials. Hormonal methods use exogenous synthetic testosterone and 
progestogens (in the form of a pill, injection, or skin cream) to prevent the production of 
normal sperm. Non-hormonal methods target the vas deferens, the tube which carries sperm 
to the ejaculatory ducts, and which is severed in a vasectomy. The two most prominent of 
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these vaso-occlusive methods are the reversible inhibition of sperm under guidance 
(RISUG) which involves the injection of an obstructive polymer in the vas deferens, and 
the intra-vas device (IVD), an injectable plug which filters sperm from passing through 
(see e.g. [59,60]).       
 
Regardless of their uptake, the availability of safe, effective, reversible male contraceptives 
would likely change the discourse around contraceptive responsibility. The addition of new 
options to an array of value-laden choices is never normatively neutral. Rather, it changes 
the space of choices and mandates greater reflection as to which is the most appropriate, 
and can radically boost or reduce the attractiveness of options which were previously 
acceptable (see e.g. [61]). Many couples engaging in PIV sex may, for the first time, find 
themselves considering fairness and burden-sharing in their negotiation around 
contraception.26 Important conversations are currently conveniently circumvented by the 
absence of male options; men do not face the difficult choice of taking on the responsibility 
for avoiding pregnancy via a long-term medication (and all its side effects) because no such 
choice is available. Those refusing to countenance male LARCs may feel compelled to 
explain why they nonetheless expect women to use comparable methods, bringing the 
decades-long contraceptive asymmetry to the fore. It may be that the mere existence of 
LARCs would lead to a rise in the number of men taking primary responsibility for 
condom-use, as a comparatively attractive alternative. It would undoubtedly bring about a 
much greater appreciation of the sacrifice so many women have made for so long in order 
to minimise the risks of PIV sex for all partners.  
                                                          
26 The availability of male LARCs would likely necessitate a greater focus on contraceptive negotiation in 
sex education curricula in schools, which is where many young people receive their knowledge of sex and 
contraceptive outside the fictions of pornography. 
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Should male LARCs become a standard, expectable form of contraception, this could affect 
abortion discourse, and encourage new ways of analysing risk and responsibility which 
disrupt the well-worn arguments that have long characterised the debate. As we have seen, 
expecting women to take responsibility for contraception tends to mean they are blamed 
for contraceptive failure. Instead expecting sexually-active men to have contracepted 
before they engage in any PIV sex might mean that, in the event of an unwanted pregnancy, 
questions would be asked about whether he was properly contracepted, and if not, why he 
thought it acceptable to engage in PIV sex when the act of doing so posed a much greater 
risk to his partner than to himself. As I have noted, common discourses around abortion 
note that since women who are raped do not consent to sex, a fortiori they do not consent 
to pregnancy. Many people conclude that abortions are acceptable in such cases, if not in 
others. Accordingly, one might argue that women who consent to sex with men who 
effectively cannot make them pregnant do not consent to pregnancy, any more than a 
person who consents to a medical procedure under general anaesthetic consents to pain, or 
a person undergoing minor skin surgery consents to amputation. If pain or amputation did 
occur in those cases, it would be attributed to error on the part of the physician, or even 
negligence if appropriate care was not taken. Likewise, in a world in which male LARC-
use is expected, a woman’s need for an abortion might be seen to result from the failure of 
another person’s attempt to prevent impregnation, or, if no contraception was used, another 
person’s negligence.27 While one might argue that a woman should still check that a man 
has contracepted, it is surely not acceptable to expect one group of people to take 
                                                          
27 Note that these arguments have no effect on the moral permissibility of abortions which occur in women 
for whom the pregnancy was at some point wanted, but later becomes unwanted. These arguments are 
therefore not intended to single-handedly defend abortion, but to bring about a shift in the discourse around 
the practice. 
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responsibility for another group’s responsibilities, or else the original asymmetry is 
reproduced. In short, men know they can impregnate, and should not engage in PIV sex 
unless they have made their risk to others nominal.  
 
While the decision to take primary responsibility for contraception by using LARCs would 
ultimately lie with men, social norms are created and maintained via the collaborative 
actions of various social institutions. Governments, researchers, public health officials, 
medical professionals, and school-teachers would have critical roles to play in ensuring 
that male LARCs contribute to justice in PIV sex in the ways that I have described. While 
pharmaceutical companies, following the behaviours of markets, are likely to dominate the 
development and sales of these new methods, other parties will influence their uptake and 
social significance. Public-funded research would be needed to explore any actual or 
potential barriers; government funds would need to be committed to ensuring that male 
LARCs are widely available; public health campaigns and medical professionals would be 
critical to disseminating accurate information and encouraging male LARCs as the 
standard method for avoiding unwanted pregnancy; school-teachers would play a key part 
in explaining and championing the important role of male LARCs in fairly minimising 
pregnancy-risk.  
 
COUNTERARGUMENTS 
I have argued that justice in relation to the pregnancy-related risks of PIV sex requires that 
men are offered LARC options, and that they thereby choose to take primary contraceptive 
responsibility. In this section I briefly present and combat a series of concerns and 
counterarguments. 
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Men would not use LARCs 
Thus far, the major barrier to male contraceptives has been biological: safe, effective male 
hormonal contraceptives are not available. The failure to develop male contraceptives is 
largely due to social norms about who ought to take responsibility for PIV sex, which 
would still apply if LARCs became widely available, and may impede their uptake. Worse, 
this is not merely a question of responsibility. LARCs are likely to face particular kinds of 
resistance that condoms do not engender, since the purpose of LARCs is to reduce the 
fertility of a man. For many men, “virility” is strongly connected to masculinity, which is 
often a fiercely-defended identity [62].  
 
Yet the available data belies these expectations. In a study conducted in Edinburgh, Cape 
Town, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, between 44 and 83% of men said that they would use a 
male contraceptive pill [63]. According to a 2019 YouGov survey, a third of UK men would 
use a contraceptive pill, which matches the proportion as women who currently use 
hormonal contraception in the UK [64]. Despite this, representations of male LARCs remain 
trapped in a cycle of unhelpful and inaccurate social representations, which threaten their 
medical development and eventual uptake [65].  
 
It is nonetheless important to think intersectionally. A person’s relationship to long-term 
contraception may be differentially determined by their social identities, given the way in 
which forced sterilisation has been used to violate the reproductive rights of people of 
colour, indigenous people, disabled people, and poor people [5–8]. Those groups may be 
particularly resistant to new forms of long-acting contraception, and any concomitant 
public health campaigns. Clearly, sensitivity to particular histories is needed in discussing 
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and delivering new and existing forms of contraception.28    
 
Women would not trust men to use LARCs 
In discussions of male contraceptives, it is often claimed that women would not trust male 
partners to use contraceptives. If that were the case, even if male LARCs were available, 
women would be likely continue to use their own contraception, thereby perpetuating the 
current asymmetry and perhaps even rendering male LARCs superfluous. This myth itself 
derives from problematic assumptions about men’s inability to take responsibility within 
the sexual domain, which, as we have seen, derive from the same discourse which 
underwrites the idea that men cannot control their sexual urges and are inherently 
incompetent at performing domestic labour [13,14].   
 
Again, the data challenges these assumptions. In a study carried out in Scotland, South 
Africa, and China, just two percent of women said that they would not trust their partners 
to use a male contraceptive [67]. As Campo-Engelstein convincingly argues, women do not 
see their male partners as instances of some generalised stereotypical man, but rather as the 
individuals they know them to be [14]. Therefore, in longer-term relationships, it is likely 
that women would trust their partners to take responsibility for contraception. Within such 
relationships, men are less likely to be able to easily evade the responsibilities arising from 
an unwanted pregnancy, and more likely to empathise with the plight of a pregnant partner, 
and so have a vested interest in avoiding unwanted pregnancy. In more casual encounters, 
barrier methods are in any case preferable. 
                                                          
28 That said, women of colour (say) must not lose out in terms of continued contraceptive injustice through a 
failure of the medical profession to engage appropriately with men under the banner of cultural sensitivity. 
Consider Kimberlé Crenshaw’s ground-breaking work on the failure of intersectionality in suppressing 
domestic abuse statistics in Black communities due to sensitivities relating to racist stereotypes of Black men 
as violent, thereby under-serving the needs of Black women survivors [66]. 
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Women value control 
Another important objection derives from the fact that many women value the control they 
have over the risks of PIV sex, and find contraceptive sovereignty empowering. The terms 
of PIV sex—i.e. how and when it is done—are still primarily determined by men, against 
the backdrop of a society in which women’s sexual autonomy is delimited and policed by 
gendered social norms. In this context, it is perhaps expectable that some women may be 
protective of the power they wield over managing the risk of pregnancy. It might even be 
argued that since the consequences of sex take place in a woman’s body, only she ought to 
have control over whether or not PIV sex is contracepted. Shifting the responsibility for 
contraception onto men may feel like relinquishing the limited control women have over 
PIV sex.  
 
Valuing the burden of contraceptive responsibility could be described as an adaptive 
preference, in which women come to internalise the modicum of control they have over 
PIV sexual encounters, and desire what is burdensome as a way of avoiding the cognitive 
dissonance of confronting the obvious injustice [68]. If that is the case, the introduction of 
other options in the form of male LARCs might provide conditions under which these 
deformed desires could be modified. One would also hope that the shift in discourse 
brought about by a more just distribution of contraceptive responsibility would change the 
terms of PIV sex in ways that would allow women more meaningful sovereignty over other 
aspects of PIV sex. The introduction and uptake of male LARCs would likely improve 
contraceptive negotiations, and one would hope that this would lead the way for greater 
reflection and negotiation in relation to other aspects of PIV sex.   
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CONCLUSION 
Given that women are burdened with the risk of unwanted pregnancy when they engage in 
PIV sex, men should do their utmost to ensure that their ejaculations are responsible, 
otherwise women shoulder a double burden of pregnancy risk plus contraceptive burden. 
The development of male LARCs would optimise men’s ability to take responsibility for 
protecting against the pregnancy-related risks of PIV sex. Accordingly, it would likely 
change the discourse around responsibility for PIV sex, and problematise the double 
burden—of pregnancy risk plus contraceptive responsibility—it places on women. In light 
of the biological necessity of the former burden, I have argued that the fairest way to 
distribute the latter burden is for men to reliably assume sole or chief contraceptive 
responsibility. At present, that means that men should acquire and use condoms and, where 
possible, contribute to any costs incurred in the use of female contraceptives; in the future, 
men engaging in PIV sex should ensure that they use a LARC. This would make the terms 
of PIV sex more equitable. It might also shift our conceptions of responsibility for 
unwanted pregnancy in ways that impact on the debate around abortion.   
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